A intersubjetividade em Husserl: uma análise da naturalização da fenomenologia

Abstract

This thesis analyzes some topics of the naturalization of phenomenology. This is a recent trend in the field of philosophy of mind and cognitive science. Naturalizing phenomenology, or consciousness, means analyzing the experiential processes of objectification, stored or not by phenomenal data, through the broad methodological perspective of naturalism. The analysis I propose in this work is based on original phenomenology, i.e., I mainly use concepts elaborated by Edmund Husserl. Especially, consider the issue of intersubjectivity and its related concepts such as intentionality and intuition. His well-known anti-naturalist stance urges us to analyze the budgets of naturalized approaches to phenomenological concepts. To think about the compatibility of Husserlian propositions with some naturalized proposals of consciousness, I fall back mainly on authors such as Daniel Dennett and John Searle. Dennett made a nominal criticism of Husserl, which is important for the proper characterization of the phenomenological method as nonintrospective and which has intersubjectivity as one of its constituent strata. In addition, Dennett also makes the concept of intentionality linked to his notion of naturalized phenomenology, which allows us to illustrate the conflicts with Husserl's phenomenological consciousness. John Searle's intentionalism is significant for enabling a less conflictual approach, although also tensional, with Husserlian's definition of consciousness and intersubjectivity. Based on these aspects, I develop a conceptual investigation of the naturalization of intersubjectivity to indicate to what extent the phenomenological theory of intersubjectivity can be related to the debate on the problem of other minds. This is a philosophical problem that persists in the field of analytical philosophy of mind and is characterized not only as an epistemological problem but also as a conceptual problem. Under these budgets, I consider Husserl's criticisms of modern epistemologies, precisely from which the occult of the mental and its associated problems arise, to verify to what extent Husserl's phenomenology is "immune" to the main problems in the philosophy of mind. I reflect on the conceptual elements that update philosophical naturalism about what Husserl defined as naturalism in his fundamental critique, made at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century. I deal with Husserlian propositions on the problem of the constitution of the alien and the objectification of the world, themes in which intuition appears as an indispensable component, as it is present in all the intentional development of experiences, therefore, in all dynamics of phenomenological objectification. Once the conceptualization of intuition for Husserlian phenomenology has been confirmed, I develop the intuitions of a complete naturalization of intentionality, in its intuitive composition, as an element of externalization and objectification of consciousness, through expressiveness and manifestation. My proposal is not to carry out a purely exegetical analysis of Husserlian propositions, exclusively understanding the internal functions of its terms, but to bring phenomenology into dialogue with the still recent theme of the naturalization of phenomenology and its adjacent problems.