Determinantes de remuneração de executivos em empresas de capital aberto latino-americanas

Abstract

In the wake of the recent runaway executive compensation and corporate scandals, some critics have claimed that the

compensation of executives is excessive. Others have claimed

that the compensation is not properly tied to performance.

Furthermore, the tenuous link between incentive ompensation

and performance has raised concerns regarding executive

entrenchment and ineffectiveness of corporate governance

mechanism, especially in the United States and the United

Kingdom. Consequently, the determination of management

compensation has emerged as an issue of considerable

academic importance in the corporate governance literature,

and numerous studies have tried to identify the most

important factor impacting executive compensation. The

aim of this research is to study the determinants of

executive compensation in Latin America from financial

accounting measures, stock market measures, and corporate

governance characteristics (including both board and CEO

characteristics, and owner